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Modern intrusion detection systems have become highly reliable in identifying a 
malicious user on a computer system.  Their limitations, though, are increasing the need 
for an intelligent response to an intrusion.  In contrast, intelligent software decoys 
provide autonomous software-based responses to identified intrusions.  In this thesis, we 
explore conducting military deception, focusing on the use of software-driven 
simulations to respond to the actions of intruders.  In particular, this thesis focuses on a 
model of a simple deceptive response that is intended to protect a search-type program 
from a buffer-overflow attack.  During our study, we found that after identifying an 
attack attempt, simulating system saturation with processing delays worked well to 
deceive a prospective attacker.  We also experimented with providing confusing reactions 
to an identified attack attempt, such as simulated network login screens and fake root-
shells.  The results were successful, simple reactions to intrusions that mimicked intended 
system interaction, and they proved to be adequate at implementing the deception 
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I.  INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
      In the modern world of integrated computer communications, intrusion detection 
has become vital to the overall security of the individual networks.  Many intrusion- 
detection systems have been developed and implemented to detect anomalous behavior.  
Firewalls, system logs, and virus detection have all been effective in identifying attack 
protocols and preventing potential intrusions.  The usual response to these intrusions is a 
notification to the system administrator or filtering out of the network the source of the 
anomalous behavior.  But what if information can be gained by allowing the intrusion in 
a controlled manner?  Controlling the intrusion can be accomplished by crafting a 
response to a detected intrusion. 
      Two main levels of response are currently being explored.  First, a low-level 
automated response using system-call delays is examined by Somayaji and Forrest in [6] 
as a way to allow an attacked computer to preserve its own integrity.  The concept 
ignores the source and method of the intrusion and instead focuses on helping the 
affected system maintain a stable state.  In contrast, Michael and Riehle have proposed an 
intelligent software decoy to deceive the attacker while maintaining system stability [1].  
They define an intelligent software decoy as an object with a contract for which a 
violation of one or more preconditions by an agent causes the object to try to both 
deceive the agent into concluding that its violation of the contract has been successful and 
assess the nature of the violation, while enforcing all postconditions and class invariants 
[1].  In other words, they propose taking intrusion detection one step further by 
implementing intelligent responses and deception.  
 
B.  BACKGROUND 
      Computer security can be thought of as a silent alarm system that encompasses a 
computer network.  Mechanisms should always be in place to protect the network, and to 
respond to a possible attack efficiently.  Computer security is a process.  As discussed by 
Wadlow in [2], the process can be applied again and again to improve the security of the 
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system.  Wadlow compares the process of security to the ancient Greek triad-engineering 
model of Analyze, Synthesize, and Evaluate, as pictured below. 
   
   
 Figure 1.1 The Greek Triad Model 
The success of the process, though, depends on the ability to synthesize and implement 
the ideas and concepts learned through the analysis of the network.  This forces the need 
to gain as much knowledge as possible about possible computer-network attacks in 
particular. 
     Current intrusion-detection systems gain information about attacks and attack 
profiles, but they fall short at being dynamically adaptable and truly intelligent about 
their response to the attack.  Most systems are capable of terminating connections, killing 
processes, and blocking certain messages from the network.  As with most security 
devices, though, in practice these mechanisms cannot be widely deployed because of the 
threat, or risk, of false and inappropriate responses.  Somayaji and Forrest suggest that 
the intrusion detection systems become too much of a burden to effectively analyze and 
respond to anomalies because of the overhead associated with human analysis [6].  It 
follows that an intelligent and autonomous solution is needed not only to protect the 
network, but also to gain information about current attacking techniques.   
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 C. SCOPE 
      Our research focuses on exploring the level of response that is appropriate for an 
intelligent software decoy.  We study three levels of response:  simple, intermediate, and 
complex.  Each level has unique development issues currently being explored, but they 
all relate back to the process of engineering the software decoy.  The simple level of 
response seeks to exaggerate affects on the system caused by malicious use.  By contrast, 
intermediate- level responses seek to respond to an attack by mimicking a previous attack.  
Finally, a complex- level response could simulate a successful attack on an entire 
computer system or network. 
      This thesis is limited to three primary tasks:  discussing the concept of a software 
decoy, defining the levels of complexity of the responses, and examining the practicality 
of a decoy through the development of a model of a simple response.  After we define 
each level of response, we develop a simple response model based on a Java Servlet 
program defending against a buffer overflow attack.  By developing this proof-of-concept 
model, we hope to gain valuable insight into the development of more complex and 
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II.  DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENT SOFTWARE DECOYS 
A.   BACKGROUND 
 With the always- increasing dependence on computer systems and computer 
networks in today’s society, application possibilities are limitless.  Unfortunately, the risk 
of malicious use and information compromise is also increasing.  Modern computer 
systems must be designed to prevent unauthorized access to the resources and data they 
contain.   
    Intrusion can be defined as a deliberate attempt to gain access to unauthorized 
information, to change or manipulate information, or to make a system unstable and 
unusable.   All are attempts to degrade the computer system’s to provide for desired 
levels of confidentiality, integrity, availability, and other security properties.     
 While intrusion-detection systems have been studied exhaustively, they are still 
reactive rather than pro-active to intrusions.  For instance, one of the most popular and 
widely used ways that intrusions are detected is through audit-trail use.  This involves 
studying each event that happens on a system as recorded through the continuous logging 
of events.  The amount of data collected per day could be quite large, especially if one 
instruments a system to monitor many events that occur on a frequent basis.  Software, 
however, has been developed to allow the quick studying of events and to look for 
anomalous behavior.  The two main ways to discover an intrusion are anomaly 
identification and misuse detection. 
 1. Anomaly Identification 
 Behavior in a computer system can be best described by defined functionality of a 
user within a system.  Each user has pre-defined rules that govern their actions while a 
member of that computer domain.  These rules are based on statistical profiles that are 
developed for individual computer users [13].  The current behavior of the user is then 
compared with recorded behavior to determine whether it is normal.  Identification of 
anomalies can potentially recognize unforeseen attacks, although it is not foolproof.  
Anomaly identification can be limited by vague rules which make it difficult to 
distinguish between normal and abnormal behavior.   
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For example, a trusted user may have the privilege to modify a particular file, 
while an untrusted user who is accessing the file over a network connection may only 
have permission to read the file.  In this case, an anomaly would occur if the untrusted 
user tried to modify or change the permissions of the file to give him access so he can 
then modify the contents. 
 2. Misuse Detection 
 Intrusions can be described in terms of the indications and signs they leave behind 
on the system.  Misuse is based on expert knowledge of patterns associated with 
unauthorized use or activity [13].  These patterns, sometimes called signatures, are 
compiled and then implemented into detection programs that find a match between a 
signature and current activity.  Pattern analysis can also be used to study logs and system-
audit information.  Once a pattern is identified in the logs, it can be described abstractly 
to allow its recognition in the future. 
 The principles employed with intrusion detection systems are widely used today 
to protect information systems.  They supplement tools such as firewalls, encryption, and 
authentication.   
 
B. DECEPTION PRINCIPLES 
 Sun Tzu makes a simple yet profound statement in The Art of War that “All 
warfare is based on deception”[8].  An argument certainly can be made that computer 
security, and indeed information assurance, is a part of future warfare.  Can deception 
help protect systems?  Can it encourage an enemy’s arrogance by feigning a poorly 
protected computer network?  
Deception fundamentals are provided from other basic military operational 
techniques.  The following are the six basic rules of deception that could be applied to 
computer deception [7].  We also include two other basic concepts of deception and 
cheating discussed in [9]:  hiding and showing.   
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 1. Believability 
 The effectiveness of deception is first based on the ability to have the enemy 
believe what he is experiencing is real.  That is, to make an action appear to coincide with 
the enemy’s preconceived notion of the expected results.  For computer security, the 
enemy is the malicious user who is attempting to access a system without the proper 
permissions.  To make the deceptions successful, the malicious user must believe he is  
accessing the system.  The correct simulated reaction to attacker input, generated 
directories that appear to have accepted malicious code, and appropriate delays to 
simulate compilation may make the simulation of a computer attack believable.  
 2. Timely Feedback 
 Timely feedback is an essential element of all major deceptions.  It is important to 
observe the reaction to any deceptive activity because if the attacker does not accept the 
deception, the system running the simulation may be vulnerable.  In an autonomous 
intrusion-detection system, real- time observation is delegated to the logic of the detection 
program.  This allows observation of the reaction to the deceptive activities.  To make 
this feedback effective for an intrusion-detection system, a good study of what beliefs and 
biases are built into the attacker culture is necessary to improve the likelihood that one 
has created the correct deception to anticipate the reaction with little error.  This includes 
a study of the timeliness of actual deceptive activities.  If a computer simulation reacts 
too quickly or too slowly the activity may not fool the attacker.  Therefore, the simulation 
of system effects of an attack must occur in accordance with the time the attacker 
expects. 
 3. Integration 
 The plan for deception should be integrated with the goals of the operation; in 
particular the normal processing of a computer system should include the well- formed 
plan for deception.  The operation and deception plans must be mutually supportive and 
should complement each other.  This will not allow for ad- libbed deceptive operations 
that have been shown to be counterproductive [7].  When the deception is integrated 
properly into the operational plan, the overall effect will provide believable indicators of 
the false operations and will deny believable indicators of the real operation.  Integrating 
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the deception within the software of a system, as opposed to using a separate Honeypot-
type system [18], may allow for a more effective way to use computers to protect 
themselves against attacks vice dedicating separate networks to catch and analyze 
intrusions.  
  4. Denial of True Activities 
 The deception must be stealthy and should protect the true activities.  In computer 
system terms, a carefully constructed software-based deception could effectively deceive 
an attacker, but only if the attacker does not receive contradictory information from the 
real activity of the system.  One way to suppress the actual operating system functionality 
would be to isolate the attacker so he has no ability to interact with the real operating 
system.  Isolating the attacker in the software is accomplished by coordinating system 
delays in the place of actual system interaction.  Another way to protect the true activities 
of a computer system is to portray the time a process takes to complete while not actually 
performing the task.  For instance, if a search program takes a certain amount of time to 
accomplish, then a simulation of that search should delay the user for that same time.  
Delays can be used effectively to simulate system interaction thereby denying the actual 
activity of the computer. 
 5. Realistic Response 
 Deception should be a function of the level of response desired to ensure the 
proper degree of realism.  There should be a level of deception that is proportional to the 
time that is needed to analyze a situation and take appropriate action.  For example, if an 
attacker is simply attempting to launch a denial of service program on a system, it may be 
sufficient only to delay for the amount of time it takes to compile the program.  It may 
not be necessary to carry the deception past the simple delay.  However, if an attacker 
tries to place a root kit program on a target, it would be necessary to simulate a root-shell 
screen with input and output capabilities.  The root-shell should also be supported by a 
simulated complex file-system to make the response as realistic and believable as 





 6. Imagination 
 History has shown that the most successful deceptions have been imaginative and 
creative.  When a deception becomes too predictable or stereotyped, the effectiveness 
may be compromised.  Standard deceptive responses should not be developed and should 
not imply the development of a capability that has not been realized.  Deception is best 
accomplished by utilizing inventive and bright ideas.  Imaginative computer deceptions 
can include creative error messages, generated file systems that are viewable to the 
attacker, and the appearance of new interactions.  The deceptions should, however, 
follow along with what is expected to ensure the believability of the simulation.  On the 
other hand, if an attacker finds he is presented with an unexpected way to gain access to a 
computer system, he may be more inclined to attempt a breach.  Some other creative 
ways to keep an attacker’s attention could be to present file systems that are seemingly 
retrievable, simulate the allowance of an attacker to place files on a system then modify 
them, and also to create an environment that simulates root-access that is receptive to 
input and output.  The imagination of the simulation programmer is unlimited, and the 
development of software can support nearly any kind of simulation. 
7.   Hiding 
According to [9], the psychology of deception uses two basic concepts of the 
devices found in nature.  The first concept, hiding, fulfills the basic purpose of deception 
to screen the thing you mean to protect.  Altering and covering the particular details of 
the thing, in our case a computer system, can be used to gain some advantage over a 
potential adversary.  For example, we can hide an important file on a computer system by 
saving the file under a different name among some other bogus files with non-descriptive 
names.  Hiding computer system information can also be thought of much like hiding a 
submarine in a vast ocean.  Software decoys, in general, will avoid hiding themselves on 
a system, but they can be used to hide the actual operating-system functions.  For 
example, decoys can hide the fact that they are delaying a user, to simulate system 





8.   Showing 
Showing is a deception where an altered truth is presented.  There are three ways 
to show the false:  by mimicking, inventing, or decoying.  A replica of reality is created 
by selecting one or more characteristics of the real to achieve an advantage when 
mimicking [9].  There are many classic military examples of mimicking.  For instance, 
the Germans during World War I portrayed to the Belgians that their force was more than 
150,000 troops when it was indeed less than 20,000.  The German mimic was a success 
because there was an extended period of time when the illusion was not revealed, 
allowing them to gain an advantage.  Mimicking with software is accomplished with a 
Honey Pot-type system that pretends to be an unprotected computer system or network 
and seems to be easier prey for intruders than true production systems with minor system 
modifications [20].   
Inventing, on the other hand, displays through the fashioning of an alternative 
reality.  For instance, a false file created on a system is still a file, and it does not mimic a 
real file.  The goal when inventing is to create something that has the effect of being real 
to ultimately conceal the real.  Invention in computer systems can be accomplished with 
scripted games where the input from an attacker is anticipated, and the intended result is 
simulated to look real.  In this way, an alternate cyber-world is created that seems 
interactive, but is actually only responding in a predetermined way. 
Finally, decoying can be simply defined as deploying some unified type of 
defense with a variety of potential directions and possibilities.  When a decoy is properly 
implemented, it can hide the real intentions with false options.  In military operations, 
decoying attempts to mislead the time or direction of a particular attack.  Computer 
systems can accomplish decoying by simulating that an attack is actually functioning as 
intended, but without actual operating system interaction.  Computer system decoying 
will most effectively be accomplished by planting simulation routines into the software 
that will simulate attacks when triggered.  This type of decoying is in contrast to the 
Honey Pot vision discussed in [20] in that it is integrated into the system through the use 
of intelligent software and preconditions. 
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C.   SOFTWARE-BASED DECEPTION RESPONSE 
 A “software decoy,” as proposed by Michael and Riehle in [1], seeks to develop 
the capabilities of intelligent software modules to react to malicious use.   For a software 
decoy, we propose that there are three main goals of a deception: correct identification of 
malicious behavior, isolation of the attacker, and believable simulation of the attack 
effects. 
1. Correctly Identify Attacks   
As previously discussed, accurate and timely detection of anomalous behavior is 
the cornerstone of the success of the deception.  Current intrusion-detection systems can 
identify malicious use.  Can they identify all attacks?  Not yet, but many rules defining 
“acceptable” behavior exist and should be used.  These rules have well- formed thresholds 
that are set high enough to allow for a high degree of confidence in their capabilities to 
correctly identify attack protocols.  With any detection system, for example with 
biometrics, obtaining false positives and negatives are a possibility.  A set of 
preconditions should be developed for software decoys that will allow a high degree of 
confidence in the detection logic.   
2. Isolate Attacks 
Simple decoys can extend a particular program; if certain behavior is observed, 
the program can behave in a way other than what is intended.  In fact, the program is 
behaving how the programmer envisioned, but the system accessibility of the user is 
being carefully controlled by the program logic.  The malicious user can be thought of as 
operating in a chamber that looks and acts like the operating system he expects, but is 
actually an isolated part of the program that cannot interact with the actual system.  How 
an attacker can be isolated is up to the programmer.  For instance, the programmer could 
offer a root-shell that looks and acts interactive, but is actually a data-collection box that 
has no ability to send commands to the processor other than “Quit.”  While the isolation 
logic must be completely foolproof, so there is no threat of unintended system 
interaction, it is, nonetheless, essential to a decoy.   
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3.  Believable Simulation   
The success or failure of the decoy hinges on the ability to deceive the attacker.  
There are two main concepts to make the simulation believable to keep the attacker 
occupied and away from the actual system:  make the reactions predictable and make the 
interaction real-time.  
a. Predictable Reactions 
Thorough research into the expected results of a given attack must be 
done.  The simulated system response should be in line with what the intruder is 
intending.  For example, when a root kit is successfully installed on a computer with a 
Trojan horse, the attacker will expect access to the system as a root user with root 
privileges.  The deception should account for this by presenting a simulated root shell 
that the attacker can use; otherwise the reaction will not be predictable and could fail.  It 
may also, however, be interesting to an attacker to find some confusing and unexpected 
results to an attack attempt.  The reaction may inspire new attempts and create new 
protocols from which new intrusion detection signatures can be developed. 
b. Real-Time Interaction 
Beyond protecting the operating system, the main goal of a decoy is to 
keep the attacker occupied and away from the main system.  To keep the attacker 
occupied, the interaction should be real-time.  If each step of the simulation needs to be 
compiled or logically determined, the delay may cause the attacker to become 
uninterested or, worse yet, uncover the simulation.  For instance, if the attacker tries to 
cause a denial of service by flooding the network, every command that the attacker (and 
other users, too) tries to execute must be delayed accordingly.  This real-time interaction 









III. ATTACKS AND RESPONSES 
A.   ATTACK PROFILE 
 For this study, we narrowed our scope of possible computer exploits to a well-
known attack profile.  We chose a buffer overflow exploit because of the large amount of 
documentation available on the protocol of the attack.  A buffer overflow attack is a 
classic exploitation in which a malicious user sends a large amount of data to a server to 
crash the system.  The system component contains a buffer of fixed size in which to store 
this data.  If the amount of data received is larger than the buffer, parts of the data will 
overflow onto the stack.  If the component does not properly handle the resulting 
exception that is raised, a security breach is possible.  By tricking a program into loading 
machine code into its memory, it is possible to overwrite the return pointer of the 
function [10].  If this data is code, the system will then execute any code that overflows 
onto the stack. 
 Buffer overflow attacks exploit the lack of bounds checking on the size of input 
being stored in a buffer array.  By writing data past the end of an allocated array, the  
attacker can make arbitrary changes to program state stored adjacent to the array.  In 
practice, the most common buffer overflow technique is to exploit the weakness by 
attacking the buffers located on the stack itself.  Since the program input comes from a 
network connection, and since file processing often involves temporary changes in access 
rights, the class of vulnerability may allow any user anywhere on the network to become 
a root user on a local host.  This makes buffer overflow attack identification critical to 
practical system security. 
 When the attacker is seeking to inject his attack code, he provides an input string 
that is actually executable code.  The code is primarily binary machine code that is native 
to the operating system being attacked, and it can be simple.  A common attack in Linux 
systems produces a basic shell which the attacker can then use to enter the system.  The 
injected attack code is a short sequence of instructions that creates a shell, under the user-
ID of root.  The effect is to give the attacker a shell with root privileges. 
 Normally, the targeted program would not execute malicious code that is entered 
as input, through a string.  However, if that input is sufficiently long, the buffer can 
 14 
 
overflow because the input to the program is placed on top of the process stack, where 
the computer is keeping track of the program’s input and output [13].  When a program 
function is invoked, a return address to the next code to be executed is placed on top of 
the stack.  The input buffer is placed on top of that address allowing for the opportunity 
to write into that space with the input data.  Using this technique, it is possible to 
overwrite the return address with a malicious address.  This allows the attacker to control 
the jumping of the function back to the attack code instead of the point where the 
function call was made.   
 The process of engineering a buffer overflow attack is not simple, but can be done 
by an attacker reverse-engineering the targeted program.  This is necessary to determine 
the exact offset that the buffer needs to compute the return address in the stack frame.  
Sometimes, to lessen the complexity of engineering an attack, an attacker estimates the 
return address, then repeats the desired return address several times within the 
approxamate range of the current return address.  
 The description of the attack techniques makes it sound as if exploitation through 
construction of a buffer overflow were quite straightforward.  The real work, however, is 
finding a poorly protected buffer in which to attack.  Many systems have vulnerabilities 
that lend themselves to this and many other types of attack, in fact.  In 1997, it was 
reported that the most common vulnerabilities on the Internet were buffer overflow and 
shell escapes [13].  A shell escape incorporates malicious code into the input data for a 
program following an escape character within a sequence of commands.  In some cases, 
when a system encounters the escape character, it invokes a shell program to interpret 
and handle the code.  Both of these vulnerabilities, whether used separately or together, 
result from the inadequate checking of input data. 
 
B. POTENTIAL ATTACKER PROFILE 
 The types of deceptions discussed so far are not specifically aimed at one type of 
attacker.  To better defend against a potential attack, it is important to understand the 
mindset and the intentions of a potential attacker.  Moreover, it is also prudent to 
understand their perception of reality and their overall attention span to effectively 
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develop responses to their malicious attempts.  Overall, an attacker can be characterized, 
as in 1999 by the Federal Bureau of Investigation [16], as a nerdy, teen whiz-kid who 
may be an antisocial underachiever, or maybe even a social guru.  Their style is different 
because they think differently, and their intentions may vary from using hacking as a 
social and educational activity to serious acts of fraud, sabotage or espionage.  This may 
be attributed to the fact that most are teenage males who are proficient in C-programming 
language, has a good knowledge of the TCP/IP protocol, and is usually intimately 
familiar with UNIX.  All of the attributes may indeed just be a profile for a regular 
teenager, but it is the attacker intentions that set them apart.  There are many types of 
attacker, and they are typically characterized by four terms:  hacker, cracker, phreak, and 
cyberpunk [16].  
  1. Categories of Attackers  
First, a hacker is typically a person who is very computer intelligent and who often 
enjoys examining operating system and application code to discover how it functions.  
This type of attacker uses his or her skill to penetrate software systems without 
permission and tamper with the data contained on them.  The biggest threat from a hacker 
is their ability to implement espionage techniques for illicit purposes, such as economical 
gain or even cyber-terrorism.      
 A cracker is popularly characterized as a user who circumvents security measures 
of a system in order to gain unauthorized access.  Their main goal is to break into a 
system without tampering with data or employing espionage techniques.  These types of 
attackers are likely to seek use of the systems resources, possibly to launch a denial-of-
service attack at a later time.  A cracker is also capable of being a governmental hacker, 
where the targets are government computers and cyber-terrorism or cyber-warfare is the 
ultimate goal. 
 A phreak, with the unusual spelling, is a person who simply is trying to use a 
network illegally, that is, without paying for the service.  These attackers have been 
observed as far back as the 1970s when phone phreaks would try to gain access to long-
distance networks using their own hardware to match the tones on the phone line.  
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Phreaks may only be interested in gaining access to elevate their own social status or 
acceptance, similar to a graffiti artist [16].   
 Finally, the last category of attacker, a cyberpunk, or script kiddie, is a 
combination of all of the above types of attacker.  Their mutation is growing from the 
proliferation of the Internet, and they may be the most common and dangerous type of 
attacker found today.  The cyberpunk may have many possible goals in mind from 
gaining social acceptance to committing robbery or to, ultimately, launching a cyber-
terrorist attack at a target, whether against the government or business. 
 2.   Attention Span 
 Considering all of the attributes of an attacker, what their intentions are, and how 
smart they really are, how much time do they actually spend trying to attack?  This may 
be too broad of a question for the scope of this thesis, but we are interested in studying 
how an attacker perceives time, and how much time he will invest to attempt his attack. 
 As a an economist once stated, "What Information consumes is rather obvious: it 
consumes the attention of its recipients.  Hence a wealth of information creates a poverty 
of attention" [17].  As far as hacking is concerned, this suggests that the time an attacker 
spends attempting access or exploiting a website is proportional to his desire to actually 
succeed.  If he tries to gain access, but is thwarted by a firewall for example, he may give 
up and try to find another victim.  Remember, most of the time the hacker is trying to 
gain not only access, but also peer recognition and popularity.   
 As far as a simple deception that manipulates time is concerned, then, how long is 
too long and how long is not long enough?  Research gained from the Honeynet Project 
[18] shows that there are advantages to speed for an attacker.  The extent of the 
advantage, though, is relative to the time a defender takes to detect and react to the attack.  
There is a strong advantage to the attacker if he can gain information about the defenses 
of a system.  If he is able to determine the defenses, by finding the reaction times 
somehow, it is likely he be able to develop a strategy for overcoming the defenses.  
Attackers will do this by attacking and then observing the reaction to the attack.  
Therefore, the deception needs to be unpredictable enough in the sense that it cannot be 
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traced, but predictable enough, in terms of reaction times, to not seem like a simulation 
and seem believable.   
 3. Attacker Perception of Time  
 It is commonly recognized that people perceive changes or events in time, not 
precisely time [19].  That is to say, it seems logical to perceive one event after another 
event, not the time it takes to complete the event.  The duration of the event is possibly 
more complex to understand.  However, what is really being measured or perceived is the 
duration of the event in the memory of the perceiver.  It is the memory of a previous 
hack, or a belief of how a hack will work, that drives the realization of the duration to a 
hacker that his attempt has been successful.   
 For the purposes of deception, an attacker perceives time on two levels.  First, 
when he launches an attack, he estimates, based on a previous attempt, how long it will 
take to process a request on a given system.  This knowledge may also be based on a 
hacker attempting small requests and observing how long each process takes.  The second 
level of time perception is purely event-driven.  That is, the attacker is only concerned 
about what happens next in the attack, similar to a script.  For this second level, he may 
not be concerned with the amount of time it takes to process a request or a malicious 
request, but he is only concerned with the end result.  For these reasons, it is important 
that the simple response model be developed with a firm grasp of processing time in 
order to implement the correct exaggerated delay into the simulation. 
 
C.       DECOY LEVELS OF RESPONSE  
           There are many different kinds of computer security, but the common thread 
among all security types is that they are proportional to the value of the system they are 
protecting.  For example, computer systems that process air-traffic control need to be 
protected much more than systems that processes flower orders.  Both systems need 
protection, to be sure, but the level of protection is vastly different.  The engineering of 
the levels of protection, because security is a process, serves as a basis for the 
development of the response.  What degree of simulation or deception is desired for the 
system and what the software decoy will protect are important questions to answer, and 
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the answer will drive the development of the deceiving software.  Three possible levels of 
decoy response are possible, each with its own advantages and limitations:  a simple-
level, an intermediate- level, and a complex- level response [1].     
           1.       Simple-Level Response 
           A simple response is a context-free response and can often be an exaggeration of 
system effects.  Additional routines can be written into software that will react in a 
predictable way when a malicious user attempts to attack the program.  This could be as 
simple as inserting exaggerated sleep time, where the user thread is rendered inactive for 
a certain period of time, into the processing of a request or it could be deceptive “games” 
that entice the attacker to stay occupied in the deception.  My study included developing 
a decoy that delays users who are identified as malicious. 
           2.   Intermediate-Level Response 
           An intermediate- level response is a step above the simple response in that it could 
run canned scripts mimicking what the attacker would expect to see when he launches a 
specific attack.  This would require a database of known attack conditions that could be 
evaluated to determine an attack is in progress.  The proper decoy or deception program 
could then be invoked.  The same principles of isolation and exaggeration would then 
apply, but the degree of difficulty of the deception could be much more complex than the 
simple-level response.  For example, if the attacker tried to run code that enabled a root 
shell to launch, the decoy could deploy a simulated shell and keep the attacker isolated 
from the system.  We experimented with creating a root-shell to mimic a Unix operating 
system that could be deployed during an identified attack, and the results are discussed in 
the next chapter. 
       3. Complex-Level Response 
       The third level of placement is the complex- level.  Decoys at this level could 
involve simulation of operating systems and networks with dynamic and distributed 
affects of an attack.  The principles of the first two response levels still apply here, that 
the attack be recognized and isolated.  A simulation could be run from a Honeynet-type 
[18] system that can broadcast simulated attack responses on a broad scale.   Of course, it 
depends how important the network is to protect as to how elaborate the decoy should be.  
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It may be efficient to simulate an entire network, possibly on a CD-ROM.  This level of 
decoying would provide many options for an attacker, and may expose some new 
information that could not be gathered when the simulation was limited to simulated 
scripts and time altering.  Decoying at this level has been investigated in [23]. 
 
D.        STRATEGY OF A SIMPLE RESPONSE 
            Sun Tzu, in The Art of War, also encourages his generals to feign incapacity when 
capable, and to seem inactive when active [8].  With software-based deception, these 
concepts suggest responses at all of the defined response levels.   However, the incapacity 
must be thoroughly thought out logically before it is implemented.  The idea is to 
anticipate the logic of the malicious user to correctly lead him down our deceptive path.   
This is attainable with thorough research into the anatomy of a simple attack.  What a 
simple response is, how a simulation is defined, and how a simple response should be 
developed are all questions that need to be answered to effectively develop a simple 
response. 
 1.   What is a Simple Deceptive Response? 
           A simple deceptive response is an attempt to simulate the effects of a malicious 
user on a system, often exaggerating the intended results.  It should be implemented into 
the software code, and it should behave in a predictable manner.  One simple deceptive 
response, as previously discussed, could be a processing delay that is implemented into 
each request an identified malicious user makes.  The simple level of response is 
envisioned as a self-protective measure embedded into software.  If its behavior is 
developed correctly, the response will be believable and will protect the system without 
using the system resources.  In other words, when an attack is realized, the software logic 
handles the malicious request by running another portion of the program, while 
continuing to provide service to other users.  A simple response is a reaction to a simple 
attack.       
 2. What is a Simulation? 
 Simulation may be the most powerful misdirection tool in computer system 
design, especially when it is combined with the development of the human interface.  
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Professional designers of computer systems create a world where interactions happen in a 
predictable and familiar way.  Simulation of these interactions can be analogous to a 
magic act.  For example, the mechanical devices and techniques that support a magic act 
are virtually transparent to an audience member.  However, there are actually two 
simultaneous acts taking place when a magician is performing:  the magician’s reality, 
and the audience members’ reality.  The magician perceives his own sleight of hand and 
manipulative devices.  The audience, though, has an entirely different view as long as the 
magician is doing a competent job [14].  This alternate reality is often where the normal 
and predictable laws are violated and defied.  Human and computer interaction in a 
simulation is developed to make the user believe that one particular thing is happening, 
but in fact something else is taking place.  A simulation is, in terms of computer 
interaction, the careful altering of a users reality. 
 3. How Should a Simple Response Be Developed? 
A simple deceptive response should be developed with some limitations 
according to a stated policy.  For example, Sun Tzu advises his generals to pretend they 
are inferior to encourage their enemy’s arrogance [8].  This could have adverse 
consequences because it could charge the attacker with vigor to defeat the deception.  
Keeping this in mind, I studied simple deceptive responses using a variety of ideas.  
Some responses are minor, some intentionally misleading and confusing.  The 
employment strategy, though, must be clear with the potential consequences of perceived 
inferiority thoroughly examined before implementation.  Even with this simple response, 




IV.  IMPLEMENTATION OF A SIMPLE DECEPTIVE RESPONSE 
A.        DEVELOPMENT 
            Development of the simple deceptive response incorporated all of the research of 
attacker logic as well as recognition of the limitation of the extent of the deception.  
While the research is ongoing, our intent is to demonstrate the concept of a simple decoy 
response for software-based deception with a variety of logic-based ideas.  As a starting 
point, I first state the logic of the test program by defining normal and deception mode.  I 
then explore three possible methods of implementing a simple deceptive response to a 
malicious attempt to overflow the input buffer by examining timing delays, simulated 
logon screens, and simulating a root-shell. 
 1.   Normal Mode 
 To develop a simple deceptive response, we began by modifying a program that 
was created for support of The MARIE Project [21].  The program is a Java Servlet that 
provides the user interface to the MARIE-4 system.  The basic operation of the program 
is that it accepts a list of keywords from a user via a front-end web page.  The web page 
is connected to a Jakarta Tomcat web server [22] on a Unix operating system.  The 
keywords are parsed into words using a StringTokenizer Java method [15].  The program 
searches a database in a locally stored file to find rated caption candidates that match the 
keywords.  The matched pages are then listed in decreasing order of rating.  Normal 
mode is explicitly defined as a user accessing the web page, entering a string of 
keywords, and then receiving the requested pictures and links through the browser-based 
interface.  On the top of the next page is Figure 4.1 that shows normal operation of the 







   Figure 4.1 Normal Mode Diagram 
2. Deception Mode 
 To operate in deception mode, there first needs to be a trigger inserted into the 
body of the code to allow access to the simulation once any number of abstract 
preconditions are met.  Once the preconditions are met, the deception is triggered, and the 
program is now operating in deception mode.  That is, the visual portion of the program 
looks real to the user, but it is actually responding differently in a simulated way.  If the 
preconditions are not met, the program will continue to operate in normal mode as 




   Figure 4.2 Deception Mode Diagram 
Note that if deception mode is triggered, the operating system cannot be attacked because 
the simulation will run completely within the program.  That is, the simulation is being 
run in a virtual chamber thereby protecting the operating system.  
            3.         Timing Delays 
            The development of timing delays for deception was in three phases.  First, we 
studied the strategy of the delays, then how to develop abstract precondition checks.  
Next, we designed and implemented of the notion of “Sleep.”    
             a.       Development Strategy 
                        My experimentation with timing delays tested the idea of simulating an 
increased load on a computer system.  We began with the study of a buffer-overflow 
attack on a web-based search engine.  The goal was to exaggerate the delays caused by an 
attempted denial-of-service attack.  For the deception to be successful, the thread 
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(process, which could represent a user) that is identified as malicious should be the only 
user or thread to get the exaggeration of the delay.  The servicing of other users who do 
not meet the malicious criteria should continue uninterrupted.  In modifying the original 
program, we tried to simulate the time that the image-library server would pretend to be 
busy for an identified malicious user.  The logic is that the overflowed buffer caused by 
the malicious user is bogging down the response of the computer system.  By delaying 
the request from the user, we can simulate a successful launching of an attack. 
Using the previous discussion of the time perception of a typical attacker, 
we reasoned that the delay should be proportional to the average time a program would 
take to run on a targeted system.  This time is variable due to the number of times the 
program has run and the amount of network traffic present.  In practice, the first time the 
program was called it took significantly longer to retrieve the pictures and links 
compared to other times it was called from the web link.  Therefore, the delay time needs 
to be proportional to the expected perceived time to process the malicious requests after 
the first one.  Also, if the keywords entered were vague, such as the words “sea” or 
“ship,” the search took considerably longer to complete and was aborted after five 
minutes.  Figure 4.3 below shows the results of a search for some common words, while 
operating in normal mode.   
KeyWord Times in Database Show Results Time to Search  
Plane 70792 918 3 sec 
Ship 727291 Undetermined 150 sec 
Aircraft carrier 2392 / 13003 449 3 sec 
Destroyer 37994 541 5 sec 
Submarine 11721 332 2 sec 
Helicopter 1068 31 2sec 
Surface  9157 269 1 
Jet 1877 55 1 
Sunset 1824 41 1 
Sea 1164373 Undetermined Undetermined  
Blue Angels 2226 / 487 76 1 
    
  Avg Time 2.1 sec 
 
                  Figure 4.3 Keyword Search Table 
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 The amount of search time in Figure 4.3 was used to help determine the 
time the program would need to search for keywords, so that the delay time could be 
added proportionally.  The results of the delay are displayed in Figure 4.4.    
 b.   Precondition Checks 
             First, to identify a malicious user, we added a number of precondition 
checks to the program to evaluate whether a user was attempting to launch a buffer-
overflow attack.  All preconditions were evaluated after the keyword string was broken 
down into words with the StringTokenizer method [15] and before the words were 
matched in the database.  We assign a weight factor to each precondition to allow for 
different degrees of suspicion depending on the likelihood that the attack is really an 
attack vice a typographical error.  We started by creating strings of known attack 
beginnings as a comparison for the keyword strings.  Then, we asked the following 
questions: 
   (1)  Does the keyword string begin with “file//”?  If the string 
begins so, there might be an attack impending since the text contains escape characters.  
But the string could also have been a typographical error, and the user may not be 
attempting an attack.  As a result, we assign the likelihood of attack a value of 1, which 
will still trigger the delay, but the program will still attempt to search for the pictures 
after the delay.  
   (2)  Does the keyword string begin with C-code?  This check is a 
little more complex, but the likelihood of attack is higher if it succeeds.  First, we 
determine if the keyword string begins with an expression that resembles the beginning 
of a C-code program, such as “#define.”  Then, we determine the number of words, or 
tokens, that are present in the string.  We reason that if there are many words, the 
likelihood of a malicious program is larger because a program contains many tokens of 
varying length.  For this precondition, we choose twenty tokens as a starting point.  If 
there are more than twenty words present in the string we assign a value of ten to the 
likelihood variable.  If there are between ten and twenty words there is still a moderate 
possibility that the string is a program and the likelihood variable is assigned a value of 
two.  Coupled with the first check of “#define,” we reason that either length of string is 
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an indicator of a possible attack.  There is one difference in the reaction.  A moderate 
likelihood of attack will delay the user, then display the results of the search.  A 
probability assignment of ten, however, will delay the user for a long period of time then 
close the connection by exiting the program 
   (3)  Does the string begin with a “//”?  Then we evaluate the length 
of the keyword string.  The theory is that if there is an escape sequence followed by a 
long string of characters, the likelihood is high of a buffer-overflow attack attempt.  A 
minimum keyword string length of 100 characters was chosen to be sure there is an 
attack underway if there are that many characters present.   If the number of characters 
exceeds 100, we assign a delay probability of ten and send the user to an unrecoverable 
sleep sequence that will terminate the connection.  The slash combination, however, may 
in fact be a typographical error not intended to launch an attack if the string is not 100 
characters long, so we assign a delay probability of one, then retrieve the pictures from 
the repository, knowing that other logic in the program will prevent a search for non-
English code-name words.   
   (4)  Is there only one long keyword entered?  If that word has a 
length greater than 50 characters, we reason that the probability of attack is moderately 
high, and assign a value of seven.  The program delays for a long time, and the server 
will close the connection before any pictures are retrieved.   If the count of words is again 
only one, but the string is less than 50, the user may have forgotten spaces between the 
words.  For this reason, we allow a search without delaying knowing that the word may 
not be valid at which time the only result will be an error statement output to the user. 
   (5)  Are there more than ten keywords?  If more than ten tokens are 
entered, we reason that there is a low probability of attack.  The delay factor in this case 
will be small (one), but compared to the length of delay for the program to search for the 
pictures it is not significant.  The reasoning is that if an attack were attempted, there 
would probably be other triggers present that would be determined by the previous 




 c. The Sleep Method 
  Once the triggers were declared, the actual delay function of the program 
was developed.  The most straightforward way to delay is to put a suspicious user thread 
in a Java-defined sleep mode for a certain amount of time.  The delay should also have a 
randomness about it that could be modified by the code calling the method.  And lastly, 
the code should have two modes of operation, one that eventually returns the user to 
normal mode, and one that terminates the user thread without returning. 
  Putting a user thread to sleep is a simple, yet effective way to delay the 
user.  The Java sleep method, when called on a running thread, forces the thread into a 
non-active, or sleeping, state.  A sleeping thread cannot use a processor even if one is 
available [15].  The sleeping thread only becomes ready after the designated sleep time 
expires. 
  The code should be able to randomly generate a sleep time based on the 
likelihood the tagged thread is a malicious thread.  One of the principles of deception is 
that it should not be predictable.  Randomizing the delay function is a good way to make 
the delay unpredictable.  In our program, the assigned likelihood of attack is given a 
value from one to ten, as discussed above.  This value is passed into the Sleep method as 
an integer.  If the integer is not the trigger value of 86, the Sleep method generates a 
random integer, between 1000 and 10000 representing the initial milliseconds the thread 
will sleep, using the random Java method, and multiplies that number by the likelihood 
value.  The thread is then put to sleep for that many milliseconds.  The range of values 
the user thread can be put to sleep is from 1 second to 100 seconds to parallel the time the 
system would be busy processing a malicious request.  As displayed in Figure 4.3, the 
average time for processing keywords is 2.1 seconds.  To properly mimic this time, we 
add time to simulate network congestion and possible processing queues.  Therefore, the 
minimum time for delay should be approximately two seconds, while the maximum time 
of 100 seconds will simulate a large amount of processing time based on the successful 
launch of an attack. 
  If the number passed into Sleep is a trigger value of 86, the method enters 
what we call the “deathSleep” which puts the user thread to sleep for 1000 seconds and 
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then exits without actually performing the search.  This is for when the likelihood 
variable has been given a maximum value of ten, and is intended to simulate a crash of 
the system.  Currently the value of 86 is assigned only when the input keyword string 
begins with “#define” and continues with an amount of words greater than or equal to 
twenty.   
  Figure 4.4 displays the delaying aspect graphically.  The graph plots the 
time the program takes to display the correct results while incorporating the desired 
likelihood of attack, designated in Appendix A as the “weightOfAttack.”  The results 
were obtained by entering the same eleven keywords to trigger the delay while varying 
the weightOfAttack factor.  There were three series of data collected, each over a span of 
five search attempts.  Series 1 represents the time to search with a weightOfAttack value 
of one (1), Series 2 uses a value of three (3), and Series 3 uses a value of seven (7).  The 
search times with the delay incorporated contrast the search times calculated in Figure 
4.3, showing the delay is proportional to the likelihood of attack. 






















     Figure 4.4 Time To Search With Delay Graph 
            4.          Login Screen 
 Simulating network access is an interesting alternative deception, and it can be 
used to seek to confuse and entice an attacker.  The appearance of a false network login 
screen may seem incredible and unexpected to a user, and may further confuse and entice 
him.  We used the simulated network login screen in Figure 4.5 instead of returning the 
user to the input page without pictures after the delay.  The result is confusing to the user, 
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and he may choose to try to gain access instead of actually attacking the system.  Keep in 
mind, the login screen is simply another part of the code executing, and it has no ability 
to actually logon a user, but it can appear to process input.  We experimented with a 
range of possibilities for the login screen; from allowing unlimited attempted logins with 
no delays to allowing a maximum of three attempts, with the third triggering the 
deathSleep sequence.  The program can also write usernames and passwords to an 
archive to facilitate future recognition of the user.       
   






        Figure 4.5 Login Screen 
   
      5.  Root-Shell Simulation 
          The ultimate goal of an attacker is to gain root (supervisor) privileges on a 
computer system.  Buffer-overflow attacks are often intended to produce root-shells on 
targeted and unprotected systems, especially those that are Unix-based.  We created a 
fake root-shell screen that can simulate the expected results (Figure 4.6).  We have two 
options:  we can display the simulated root-shell after any buffer overflow attempt, or we 
can display it after some number of attempted logins.  The root-shell simulation seems to 
be interactive to the user, but the shell provides, in fact, a scripted response generated by 
the software.  Whatever command the user enters at the cursor, the software follows with 
a “Command completed successfully” message.   
 30 
 
    
 
 
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
                 Figure 4.6 Root Shell Simulation 
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V.   DECEPTION EXPERIMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 To better study the effectiveness of the concept of our simple deceptive response, 
we devised an experiment to measure the reaction of test subjects.  The goals of the 
experiment were to determine if the subjects found the deception, whether the subjects 
could perceive when they were observing real or decoy-simulated delays. 
 1. Subjects 
 The participants of the study were colleagues and associates of our group.  They 
were not provided any incentive or preparation prior to their participation.  The subjects 
were separated into two categories:  either computer student or recreational user.  The 
subjects were not, though, potential attackers.  Two subjects, however, had some 
experience with the study of the anatomy of computer attacks.  See Table 5.1. 
 
  Table 5.1 Subjects 
Subject Background 
A Computer Student 
B Computer Student 
C Recreational User 
D Recreational User 
E Recreational User 
F Computer Student 
G Computer Student 
H Recreational User 
 
 2. Program  
 The program is a Java-coded program that is compiled and running on off- the-
shelf personal computer with a standard software configuration.  The program emulates 
all of the capabilities of Appendix A, while functioning without the burden of a network 
connection.  The user is able to enter keywords into a search box, as shown in Figure 5.1 







 Figure 5.1 Sample Input Screen 
 
If the keyword input is not an attack attempt, the program will respond with a message to 
simulate that a search was completed, and this indicates the program is operating in 
normal mode, as pictured below in Figure 5.2. 
 
 
 Figure 5.2 Message Box 
 
However, if the user inputs keyword data that satisfies one of the trigger 
conditions, the Sleep method is called, and the user thread is delayed.  The capability is 
also programmed into the software to trigger the simulated login screen and fake root-
shell if a known string is entered into the keyword box.     
 3. Method 
 First, the subjects were asked two questions to establish a baseline of their 
perceptions.  Number one:  How long do they expect a keyword search program would 
take to provide results?  Number two:  If they launched an attack, how long would they 
think the system would take to process their malicious request? 
Second, the users were individually placed in front of the computer with the 
program pre-compiled.  They were told the keyword box would accept their input, and 
they were asked to type in up to five words for the program to search for.  After they 
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completed two searches, they were told that the mode they were operating in was 
considered “normal.”    
 Next, they were told to enter the string “file//.”  They did not know that the string 
would trigger the Sleep method with a weightOfAttack  value set to 3.  The value of three 
was chosen to ensure the delay would not be too short or too long.  They were asked at 
this point whether they perceived if the search took longer than the two previous 
searches, with yes or no being their choices. 
 For the fourth query, they were asked to enter “#define” to trigger another delay 
with a higher likelihood of attack of 7, which would delay for a longer period of time.  
They were again asked at this point whether they perceived that their search took longer 
than when they were operating in normal mode, again with yes or no as choices. 
 The next two queries were designed to test the reaction to the presentation of the 
simulated login screen and the fake root-shell.  We inserted two keywords that would 
trigger the simulations:  log for the simulated login screen, and boss for the fake root-
shell.  The subjects were asked to enter one of these words in the search box, but not told 
what the system reaction would be.  The subjects were then asked to give their reaction to 
the system response:  surprised, not surprised, expected, or no reaction. 
 Finally, the subjects were asked to provide an overall rating of the success of the 
deception, with the range of values being a 1 (poor), 2 (not really believable), 3 (average 
believability), 4 (somewhat believable), and 5 (completely believable).  They were also 
asked to rate whether they were fooled or not, which we presented three possibilities:  
fooled, sort of fooled, and not fooled.   
 
B. RESULTS  
 The first two questions were asked of the subjects, and the responses were given 
in seconds.  In some cases, the subjects were allowed to generate approximate times for 






  Table 5.2 First Two Question Answers 
Subject Search Time (sec) Attack time to process (sec) 
A Less than 2  Approx 30 
B Less than 3  30-40 
C 3 60  
D 4  30  
E 10  Approx 60  
F Less than 2  30-40  
G Less than 5  45 or less 
H 3  Approx 30  
   
Table 5.3 displays whether the users perceived the delays during queries three and 
four: 
 
 Table 5.3 Delay Perception 
Subject Perceive Delay #1? Perceive Delay #2? 
A Yes Yes 
B Yes Yes 
C Yes Yes 
D Yes Yes 
E Yes Yes 
F Yes Yes 
G Yes Yes 
H Yes Yes 
   
 Table 5.4 now shows the reactions to the fifth and sixth queries, which sought the 
subject’s reaction to the appearance of the simulated login screen and the fake root-shell. 
 
  Table 5.4 Reaction to Queries 
Subject Reaction to Login Reaction to Root-Shell 
A NOT Surprised Surprised 
B Surprised Surprised 
C Surprised Surprised 
D NOT Surprised Surprised 
E Surprised Surprised 
F Surprised Surprised 
G Surprised Surprised 
H Surprised Surprised 
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 Finally, Table 5.5 shows the subjects’ comments, whether they were fooled or 
not, and their overall rating of the experiment. 
 
  Table 5.5 Comments and Overall Rating 
Subject Comments Fooled? Overall Rating 
A Believable, logical Fooled 4 
B Very believable, effective Fooled 5 
C Very believable, deceived Fooled 5 
D Good job, deception should work Fooled 5 
E Delay as expected, good graphics Fooled 5 
F Believable, delay was what expected Fooled 4 
G Good, delay little long, surprised Sort of fooled 4 
H Believable, good simulation Fooled 5 
   
C. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 The results of the experiment left the group optimistic about the overall validity of 
the simple deceptive response prototype.  The test subjects had a wide range of computer-
related experience, but they all reported being fooled by the deception, especially the 
delaying tactic.  While most subjects blindly estimated the processing time before the 
execution of the first search, the program successfully accounted for the processing time 
by proving valid an earlier discussion that the perception of time is not as concrete as the 
perception of the actual event.  That is, the subjects perceived that it took some amount of 
time to generate their intended reactions on the system.  All of the subjects had a 
reasonable expectation that some event would happen during the experiment, but they 
seemed to have no concept of the time the program was delaying, only, in fact, that it 
delayed.   
 The simulated login screen and the fake root-shell generated better than expected 
reactions.  Most subjects felt the appearance of the screens was surprising and believable.  
Only subjects A and D were not surprised by the appearance of the simulated login 
screen.  Subject A did expect network access to become a possibility in an attack, though 
he stated he had some knowledge of other types of attack protocols and expected results.  
Subject D also had limited knowledge of attacks and hence was not completely surprised.  
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The root-shell simulation was not expected by any of the subjects, and successfully 
surprised all of the subjects.  The reactions among the computer students were especially 
noteworthy because their subsequent interaction with the shell seemed to match their 
expectations for “normal” response of the system to their requests  That is, when they 
typed in simulated commands, the “Command completed successfully” message provided 
a sufficient level of affirmation that the input was accepted.   
 The overall believability of the response was very high, averaging 4.6 out of a 
possible 5.0.  The comments supported this rating, with most subjects stating the 
deception was either believable or, in some cases, very believable.  Also, only one 
subject, Subject G, stated he was “sort of fooled” by the tactics used, with all of the other 
subjects  stating they were for the most part fooled.   
  
D. CONCLUSIONS OF EXPERIMENT 
 The experiment, overall, provided better than expected insight into the 
believability of our simple deceptive response.  The subjects were all fooled by the 
delaying tactic, and fully surprised by the appearance of the network login screen and the 
fake root-shell.  One of our two goals was to validate the believability of our simple 
deceptive response, and that goal was attained without question.  The only skepticism we 
noted was with the more experienced subjects who thought the simulated screens were 
too easy to obtain.  However, these subjects expressed favorable remarks at the realism of 
the display, especially when integrated with the delaying method.  The delay tactic also 
provided confirming evidence for the hypothesis that potential attackers perceive the 
events in sequence, not explicitly the time to complete a process.  The subjects were not 
concerned with the time it took to process their malicious request; only that it took some 
amount of time longer than a request took in normal (non-decoying) mode.   
 The second goal of the experiment was to determine if the subjects could tell they 
were being deceived.  Since they were not told about the delay function, all subjects 
believed the computer was processing their malicious request, when it was actually 
delaying.  Coupled with the high believability factor, we can conclude that the subjects 
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did not realize that the software application was operating in deceptive mode vice normal 
mode. 
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VI.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
 Our goal was to evaluate three primary aspects of realizing intelligent software 
decoys.  First, we investigated how the concept emerged out of the current state of 
intrusion-detection systems and their limitations.  Since the concept is maturing, it was 
important to see how the notion developed from the current stagnant state of intrusion-
detection, and the emerging cyber-warfare techniques that need to be studied and 
implemented.   
 Second, as an introduction to the concept, we expanded the definitions of the 
three levels of complexity a software-based decoy response should have.  By defining 
what a simple, intermediate, or complex level of response means, we have laid the 
foundation for future research.  As the need to protect systems continues to evolve, the 
levels may change, but their underlying organization should not change substantially.   
 Finally, we examined the technical feasibility of implementing a simple- level 
deceptive response for a software decoy.  The simple model provided insight into the 
logic, technical feasibility, and practicality of generating believable software-based 
deceptive responses.  It also magnified the need for other parts of the research to fully 
develop, namely the need to have well- formed abstract preconditions. 
 
B. ACHIEVEMENTS OF RESEARCH 
 Our research into software-based deception fits between the capabilities of cur rent 
intrusion-detection techniques and potential counter-active techniques, to better equip 
computer systems for the next generation of cyber-warfare.  Defining the levels of 
response and showing how they relate to established military-deception techniques forms 
the basis for the future development and implementation of intelligent software decoys.  
Also, by demonstrating the concept is applicable to modern computer systems through 
the application of a simple response example, the research proved to be logically relevant 
and straightforward to implement.  The important first step has been taken to better 
understand the theories involved in software-based deception.    
 40 
 
C. LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 
 One limitation of our research was that the proof of concept was developed for 
one type of attack:  the buffer overflow.  Most intrusion-detection techniques focus on 
signatures and anomaly detection and are intended to be applicable to all systems.  By 
focusing on one attack technique for this research, though, the protection is not generic 
and abstract.  There are many possibilities of attack signatures, and this simple model 
does not cover all of them abstractly. 
 Another limitation of the research is that the techniques it protects against may 
not, in fact, still be valid or commonly used.  The preconditions protect against one kind 
of attack.  The decoying methods, though, can be reused for other variations of buffer-
overflow attacks. 
 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 Since the technology and concept of intelligent software decoys is still in the 
developmental stage, there exist many avenues for research.  Three particular areas are 
the following:  development of the intermediate and complex levels of response, the 
concept of isolation, and the integration of the dynamic wrapping technology. 
 The advanced levels of response -- intermediate and complex -- should be studied 
and attempts should be made to develop proof-of-concept prototypes.  As the simple 
response was developed, the idea of running canned scripts emerged as a way to 
implement the simulation.  With intermediate- level responses, the simulation can 
continue to grow and protect, culminating with the complex- level response that should 
incorporate the supervisor concept [24] and the dynamic wrapping technology. 
 Second, isolating the attacker from the system is one of the main goals of the 
decoy.  If there is any possible way to interact with the computer system directly from the 
simulation, the possibility will exist for further exploitation, and the results may be 
disastrous.  Much the same way as the simulation needs to be a closely guarded secret, 
the interaction between a malicious user and a computer system must be strictly 
controlled at all times.  The concept of a virtual, “escape-proof” chamber that the 
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simulation will run in, away from the actual operating system, should be studied and 
implemented.  Michael and Riehle have termed this an antechamber [1]. 
 Lastly, the dynamic wrapping technology that is being studied should be 
integrated with the response models.  The technology involves developing an abstract 
language to evaluate behavior of a user within a system, and that technology could be 
used to protect against a large number of, if not all, attacks.  The dynamic deployment 
capability to respond is an exciting possibility that could prove to be the best way to 
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APPENDIX A.  KEYWORD SEARCH PROGRAM WITH DECEPTION 
package dpjulian; 
//********************************************************************/ 
// Servlet for user interface to the MARIE-4 system.                  / 
// Accepts list of keywords from the user, searches a database of     / 
// rated caption candidates from RateCaps.out to find matches,        / 
// lists their pages in decreasing order of rating; user can click on / 
// them to go to those pages.  Modified with preconditions for input  / 
// of search string keywords.  Used as test to identify intrusions    / 
// and run simulated reactions to intrusion.  Modified for Masters    /  
// Thesis Naval Postgraduate School Summer 2002.                      / 













public class JulianSearchver2 extends HttpServlet { 
    /* To hold known destemmed words of English */ 
  HashSet rchs = new HashSet(); 
    /* To hold pointers to capindex.out for a word */ 
  String Indexwords [] = new String[500000]; 
  long Indexaddresses[] = new long[500000]; 
    /* To store web-page, caption, and image-file index numbers for 
words */ 
  String Word, Inputline; 
  int Indexlength; 
  int weightOfAttack; 
  int tryChecker = 0; 
  HashMap abbrevs = new HashMap(4000); 
 
    // Initialize the servlet by loading main data structures 
  public void init () { 
      System.out.println("Starting init routine"); 
      int k, k1, k2, j, j1, j2, j3, j4, j5, jend; 
    long startindex; 
    String Weightstring, sourcestring, captionstring, imagestring, 
SLoc, 
 Abbrevline, Abbrev, Expan; 
    // Load dictionary for the destemmer 
    try { rowe.Destemmer.hashKnownWords(rchs);} 
    catch (IOException e) {System.out.println("IO Error");} 
    // Load index on words that gives caption-pictureref pairs 
    k2 = 0; 
    try { FileReader fr =  
       new FileReader("/work/rowe/myjava/navy.capindexindex.out"); 
    BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(fr); 
    startindex = 0; 
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    while ((Inputline = br.readLine()) != null) { 
      // Store for each destemmed word a byte address in index.out, 
      // in alphabetical word order. 
      j = Inputline.indexOf(' '); 
      Word = Inputline.substring(0,j); 
      SLoc = Inputline.substring(j+1,Inputline.length()); 
      startindex = Long.valueOf(SLoc).longValue(); 
      Indexwords[k2] = Word; 
      Indexaddresses[k2] = startindex; 
      k2++; } 
    fr.close(); 
    FileReader fr3 = new FileReader("/work/rowe/myjava/abbrevs.txt"); 
    BufferedReader br3 = new BufferedReader(fr3); 
    while ((Abbrevline = br3.readLine()) != null) { 
 k1 = Abbrevline.indexOf(' '); 
 Abbrev = Abbrevline.substring(0,k1); 
 Expan = Abbrevline.substring(k1+1,Abbrevline.length()); 
 abbrevs.put(Abbrev,Expan); } 
    fr3.close(); 
    FileReader fr4 = new FileReader("/work/rowe/myjava/synonyms.txt"); 
    BufferedReader br4 = new BufferedReader(fr4); 
    while ((Abbrevline = br4.readLine()) != null) { 
 k1 = Abbrevline.indexOf(' '); 
 Abbrev = Abbrevline.substring(0,k1); 
 Expan = Abbrevline.substring(k1+1,Abbrevline.length()); 
 abbrevs.put(Abbrev,Expan); } 
    fr4.close(); } 
    catch (IOException e) {System.out.println("File Error");} 
    Indexlength = k2; 
    System.out.println("navy.capindexindex.out loaded."); } 
 
    /* Respond to a front-end request to find Web images whose captions  
       match at least one of a given list of keywords. */ 
  public void doGet(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse 
response)  
    throws ServletException, IOException { 
    /* To hold extracted set of keywords from user request, plus */ 
    /* index address of start of record and length of the record. */ 
    String KeywordArray [] = new String [100]; 
    long KeywordAddresses [] = new long [100]; 
    long KeywordBytes [] = new long [100]; 
    long BytesSorter [] = new long [100]; 
    int TreeMapMax = 10000; 
    /* To hold extracted set of relevant Web pages and their captions 
*/ 
    String stringresults [] = new String [TreeMapMax]; 
    /* To hold the weights for each caption result */ 
    double Resultweights [] = new double [TreeMapMax]; 
    /* To hold the index numbers for each caption result */ 
    long Resultnumbers [] [] = new long [TreeMapMax][3]; 
    /* To hold the URLs of image files */ 
    String Imagefiles [] = new String [TreeMapMax]; 
    /* To flag the caption results once shown */ 
    boolean Shownresults [] = new boolean [TreeMapMax]; 
    String keywordstring, wantpicsstring, Word, WordData, Page, 
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      SWeight, Sresultscount, resultline, CaptionNumbers, Webpage, 
      CaptionNumberString, maxcaptioncountstring, Webpagestring, 
 Captionstring, Caption, Imagelink, Pagecapstring, LastImagelink, 
 Imagestring, datastring, Weightstring, tmpword; 
    double Weight1, NewWeight, Weight, Weightmax, Weighttotal,  
 WeightThreshold; 
    Double DOldWeight, DWeight; 
    int Capnum, maxcaptioncount, showableresultscount, 
shownresultscount, 
 k, k0, k1, k2, k3, M, Wordindex, j, j2, j5, jend, 
        extraresultscount, i, i2, ilo, ihi, imed, lastimed, cmp,  
        Keywordcount, Capsfound; 
    Integer IWordindex; 
    long startindex, Pagenumber, Captionnumber, Imagenumber, 
Webpageptr, 
 tmpaddr, tmpbytes, recordlength; 
    Long Lstartindex; 
    boolean matchflag, indexflag; 
    char c; 
    Collator MyCollator = Collator.getInstance(); 
    /* Set up servlet response */ 
    response.setContentType("text/html"); 
    PrintWriter pw = response.getWriter(); 
    System.out.println("Starting doGet"); 
    /* Extract the inputs from the front Web end page, SearchCaps.html 
*/ 
    keywordstring = request.getParameter("keywords"); 
    wantpicsstring = request.getParameter("wantpics"); 
    boolean wantpics = false; 
    if (wantpicsstring.equals("pics")) {wantpics = true;} 
    maxcaptioncountstring = request.getParameter("maxcaptioncount"); 
    maxcaptioncount = 
Integer.valueOf(maxcaptioncountstring).intValue(); 
    // HttpSession session = request.getSession(true); 
    /* Use only three decimal digits of accuracy in calculation */ 
    DecimalFormat DF = new DecimalFormat(); 
    DF.setMaximumFractionDigits(3); 
    DF.setMinimumFractionDigits(3); 
    /* Open random-access index file */ 
    File af = new File("/work/rowe/myjava/navy.capindex.out"); 
    RandomAccessFile raf = new RandomAccessFile(af,"r"); 
    /* Use tree to hold weights of each relevant Web page found */ 
    TreeMap tm = new TreeMap(); 
    int KeywordCount = 0; 
    int resultscount = 0; 
    Weighttotal = 0.0; 
    Weightmax = -1000.0; 
 
    // Analyze the keywords and find pointers to those in the index; 
    // sort by increasing size of the index record (most specific 
first) 





/*****************BEGIN PRECONDITION CHECK**************************/ 
/*******************************************************************/ 
/* 
Here is a series of pre-conditions that need to be evaluated before the 
program locates the pictures in the database. 
*/ 
    // Local variables. 
    String buffOver1 = "file//"; 
    String cStart = "#define"; 
    String slash = "//"; 
 
/* 
Evaluating if the keywordstring, the input from the web page, here.  If 
the string begins with 'file//', I assume an attack attempt and delay 
but still return to find the pictures in the database. 
*/ 
   if ( keywordstring.startsWith( buffOver1 ) ){ 
   // GO TO DELAY THEN GO TO SEARCH - LOWER PROBABILITY OF ATTACK 
   // BUT DELAY THEN GET PICS 
      System.out.println( "\nAttack recognized, going to sleepX1." ); 
      weightOfAttack = 1; 
      Sleep sim = new Sleep( weightOfAttack ); 
   } 
 
/*  
Here, the check if for a beginning word of '#define'.  If the string 
begins that way, then I assume the attacker is trying to launch code 
through the browser.  If the number of words is between 1 and 20, then 
I assume it may be an attack, but it could be a typo so I delay, then 
search for pictures. If the length of the string is >= 20 words, then 
the probability of an attack is higher, when coupled with the string 
'#define'.  The value of 20 words is the chosen threshold of whether 
there is following C code present or not. 
*/ 
   if ( keywordstring.startsWith( cStart ) ){ 
 
      if ( st.countTokens() >= 1 && st.countTokens() < 20 ){ 
         System.out.println( "\nAttack recognized, going to sleep." ); 
         weightOfAttack = 2; 
         Sleep sim = new Sleep( weightOfAttack ); 
      } 
      else if ( st.countTokens() >= 20 ){ 
         System.out.println( "\nAttack recognized, going to DEATH 
sleep." ); 
         weightOfAttack = 10; 
         Sleep sim = new Sleep( 86 ); //Change when LogonScreen ok. 
      /*   LogonScreen logon = new LogonScreen();       */ 
      } 
   } 
 
/* Evaluating if there are 25 or more keywords to search for.  If there 
are,I assume there is a higher likelihood of attack, a of value 7.  




    if ( st.countTokens() >= 25 ){ 
    //GO TO DELAY, THEN GO TO LOGON SCREEN -> DOES NOT GET PICS 
       System.out.println( "\nAttack recognized, going to sleepX7." ); 
       weightOfAttack = 7; 
       Sleep sim = new Sleep( weightOfAttack ); 
       LogonScreen logon = new LogonScreen(); 
    } 
 
/*  
Here, the evaluation is whether the keywordstring input starts with an 
expression resembling a C-code program, such as a /, and whether the 
length is greater than 100 characters.  If it is, then there is a very 
high likelihood of attack.  I delay for a long time then proceed to the 
logon screen routine to end the program. 
*/ 
    if ( keywordstring.startsWith( slash ) ){ 
 
       if ( keywordstring.length() >= 100 ){ 
    // HERE, THERE IS A VERY GOOD POSSIBILITY OF AN ATTACK, SO THE 
    // DELAY SHOULD BE HIGH, THEN GO TO LOGON SCREEN 
System.out.println( "\nAttack recognized, going to 
DEATHsleep." ); 
          weightOfAttack = 10; 
          Sleep sim = new Sleep( 86 );  //Change when LogonScreen ok 
      /*    LogonScreen logon = new LogonScreen();      */ 
       } 
       else{       //The slash may be a typo, so delaying a little here 
          System.out.println( "\nAttack recognized, going to sleepX1." 
); 
          weightOfAttack = 1; 
          Sleep sim = new Sleep( weightOfAttack ); 
       } 
    } 
 
/*  
Here, if the is only one word entered, and it has a length of greater 
than 50 characters, then there is again a high probability of attack.  
I delay, then proceed to the logon screen routine. 
*/ 
    if ( st.countTokens() == 1 ){ 
 
       if ( keywordstring.length() >= 50 ){ 
          System.out.println( "\nAttack recognized, going to sleepX7." 
); 
          weightOfAttack = 7; 
          Sleep sim = new Sleep( weightOfAttack ); 
          LogonScreen logon = new LogonScreen(); 
       } 
    } 
 
/*  
If more than 10 words entered, calling Sleep to delay.  Sends 1 as 





    if( st.countTokens() >= 10 ){ 
       System.out.println( "\nAttack recognized, going to sleep." ); 
       weightOfAttack = 1; 
       Sleep sim = new Sleep( weightOfAttack ); 
    } 
 
    if ( keywordstring.startsWith( "Rowe" ) ){ //TEST - REMOVE LATER 
       LogonScreen ls = new LogonScreen(); 
    } 
/********************************************************************/ 




/ Now, continuing with the search if not in LogonScreen. 
*/ 
    KeywordCount = 0; 
    while (st.hasMoreTokens()) { 
      Word = (st.nextToken()).toLowerCase();       
      if ((Word.length()>1) && (!(numberString(Word)))) { 
        if (abbrevs.containsKey(Word)) 
       Word = ((String)abbrevs.get(Word)).toLowerCase(); 
 else Word = rowe.Destemmer.destem(Word,rchs); 
 // Do binary lookup in main-memory index to find address 
 // on disk of the record for this word 
 ilo = 0; 
 ihi = Indexlength; 
 indexflag = true; 
 lastimed = -1;           
 while (indexflag) { 
   imed = (ilo + ihi) / 2; 
   // System.out.println("imed: " + imed + " word: " + 
Indexwords[imed]); 
   cmp = MyCollator.compare(Word,Indexwords[imed]); 
   if (cmp == 0) { 
     KeywordArray[KeywordCount] = Word; 
     KeywordAddresses[KeywordCount] = Indexaddresses[imed]; 
     KeywordBytes[KeywordCount] =  
       Indexaddresses[imed+1] - Indexaddresses[imed]; 
     BytesSorter[KeywordCount] = KeywordBytes[KeywordCount]; 
     KeywordCount++; 
           indexflag = false; } 
 
 
   else if (cmp<0) ihi = imed; 
   else ilo = imed; 
   if (imed == lastimed) indexflag = false;  
   lastimed = imed; } } } 
    // Interchange pairs of entries to sort keywords by record length 
    Arrays.sort(BytesSorter,0,KeywordCount); 
    for (i=0; i<(KeywordCount-1); i++) 
      if (KeywordBytes[i] != BytesSorter[i])  
 for (i2=(i+1); i2<KeywordCount; i2++) 
   if (KeywordBytes[i2] == BytesSorter[i]) { 
     tmpword = KeywordArray[i]; 
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     tmpaddr = KeywordAddresses[i]; 
     tmpbytes = KeywordBytes[i]; 
     KeywordArray[i] = KeywordArray[i2]; 
     KeywordAddresses[i] = KeywordAddresses[i2]; 
     KeywordBytes[i] = KeywordBytes[i2]; 
     KeywordArray[i2] = tmpword; 
     KeywordAddresses[i2] = tmpaddr; 
     KeywordBytes[i2] = tmpbytes; } 
    System.out.println("KeywordCount: " + KeywordCount); 
    for (i=0; i<KeywordCount; i++) 
      System.out.println(KeywordArray[i] + " " + KeywordAddresses[i] + 
" " + 
    KeywordBytes[i] + " "); 
 
    // Store pointers for each keyword into a tree 
    System.out.println("Starting loop on keywords"); 
    Capsfound = 0; 
    for (i=0; i<KeywordCount; i++) {     
      Word = KeywordArray[i]; 
      System.out.println("Working on word '" + Word + "'"); 
      startindex = KeywordAddresses[i]; 
      recordlength = KeywordBytes[i]; 
      // Extract the index data from the capindex.out record 
      raf.seek(startindex); 
      while ((c = (char)raf.read()) != '|') {}; 
      c = (char)raf.read(); 
      while (c == ' ') { 
 Weightstring = ""; 
 while ((c = (char)raf.read()) != ' ') 
   Weightstring = Weightstring + c; 
 Pagecapstring = ""; 
 while ((c = (char)raf.read()) != '|')  
   Pagecapstring = Pagecapstring + c; 
 Pagecapstring = Pagecapstring.substring(0,Pagecapstring.length()-
1); 
 Weight1 = Double.valueOf(Weightstring).doubleValue(); 
 /* Adjust using inverse keyword document frequency. */ 
 Weight1 = 0.1*Weight1*Math.log(50000.0/(recordlength*0.03)); 
 Weighttotal = Weighttotal + Weight1; 
 // Store weight found for matched caption in tree 
 if (!(tm.containsKey(Pagecapstring))) { 
     /* System.out.println("New page " + Pagecapstring +  
        " at weight " + Weight1); */ 
   if (Capsfound < TreeMapMax) { 
     resultscount++;   
     if (Weight1 > Weightmax) Weightmax = Weight1; 
     tm.put(Pagecapstring, new Double(Weight1)); } } 
 else { 
   /* Add the weights for each keyword mentioned in the caption */ 
   DOldWeight = (Double) tm.get(Pagecapstring); 
   NewWeight = DOldWeight.doubleValue() + Weight1; 
   /* System.out.println("Page " + Pagecapstring +  
      " changed weight to " + NewWeight); */ 
   if (NewWeight > Weightmax) Weightmax = NewWeight; 




 c = (char)raf.read(); } } 
    raf.close(); 
 
    /* Now collect all the pages and fill array stringresults with 
strings 
       containing their weight and their link. */ 
    /* Set weight threshold to reduce chance of > 500 answers.  */ 
    double Weightaverage = Weighttotal/(double)resultscount; 
    if (resultscount > 1000) WeightThreshold = Weightaverage; 
    else WeightThreshold = 0.0; 
    /* Build second tree to sort the Web-page results found */ 
    TreeMap tm2 = new TreeMap(); 
    Set set = tm.entrySet(); 
    Iterator iter = set.iterator(); 
    int oldresultscount = resultscount; 
    resultscount = 0; 
    while (iter.hasNext())  { 
      Map.Entry me = (Map.Entry)iter.next(); 
      DWeight = (Double)me.getValue(); 
      Weight = DWeight.doubleValue(); 
      if (Weight > WeightThreshold) { 
   while (tm2.containsKey(DWeight)) { 
       Weight = Weight-0.0001; 
       DWeight = new Double(Weight); } 
   tm2.put(DWeight, me.getKey()); 
   resultscount++; } } 
    pw.println("<HTML>\n<BODY>\n"); 
    if (resultscount > 0) { 
      // Generate header for the returned dynamic Web page 
      pw.println("<H2>Images matching keywords &quot;" + keywordstring 
+  
   "&quot;, in order of decreasing likelihood.  (" +  
                 oldresultscount +  
                 " captions matched at least one keyword.)</H2><br>"); 
      /* Determine the actual image file URLs and store in array */ 
      File afi = new File("/work/rowe/myjava/navy.capimage.out"); 
      RandomAccessFile rafi = new RandomAccessFile(afi,"r"); 
      // Find the best captions matching the keywords 
      showableresultscount = Math.min(resultscount,TreeMapMax); 
      System.out.println("showableresultscount: " + 
showableresultscount); 
      for (k=0; k<showableresultscount; k++) { 
        DWeight = (Double)(tm2.lastKey()); 
        Weight = DWeight.doubleValue(); 
        resultline = (String)tm2.get(DWeight); 
        tm2.remove(DWeight); 
 k2 = resultline.indexOf(' '); 
 k3 = resultline.indexOf(' ',k2+2); 
 M = resultline.length(); 
 Webpagestring = resultline.substring(0,k2); 
 Captionstring = resultline.substring(k2+1,k3); 
 Imagestring = resultline.substring(k3+1,M); 
 Pagenumber = Long.valueOf(Webpagestring).longValue(); 
 Captionnumber = Long.valueOf(Captionstring).longValue(); 
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 Imagenumber = Long.valueOf(Imagestring).longValue(); 
 Resultweights[k] = Weight; 
 Resultnumbers[k][0] = Pagenumber; 
 Resultnumbers[k][1] = Captionnumber; 
 Resultnumbers[k][2] = Imagenumber; 
        Shownresults[k] = false; 
        rafi.seek(Resultnumbers[k][2]); 
        Imagefiles[k] = rafi.readLine(); } 
      rafi.close();       
      /* Open for random access the Web-page and caption files */ 
      File afs = new File("/work/rowe/myjava/navy.capsource.out"); 
      RandomAccessFile rafs = new RandomAccessFile(afs,"r"); 
      File afc = new File("/work/rowe/myjava/navy.capcaption.out"); 
      RandomAccessFile rafc = new RandomAccessFile(afc,"r"); 
      // Generate HTML for the best captions 
      shownresultscount = 0; 
      for (k=0; ((k<showableresultscount) & 
(shownresultscount<maxcaptioncount)); k++) { 
 if (!Shownresults[k]) { 
          shownresultscount++; 
          Imagelink = Imagefiles[k]; 
   Webpageptr = Resultnumbers[k][0]; 
   rafs.seek(Resultnumbers[k][0]); 
   Webpage = rafs.readLine(); 
   rafc.seek(Resultnumbers[k][1]); 
   Caption = rafc.readLine(); 
   /* If user wants pictures, insert Web image reference */ 
   if (wantpics) { 
     pw.println("<img src='" + Imagelink +  
         "'\n alt='" + Caption + "'><br>\n"); 
     /* List the Web page the above picture came from */ 
     pw.println("The above picture is from <A HREF = '" + Webpage 
+  
         "'>" + Webpage + "</A><br>\n" ); } 
   else { 
     /* Else list the Web page matching the keywords */ 
     pw.println("Try: <A HREF = '" + Webpage +  
         "'>" + Webpage + "</A><br>\n" ); } 
          extraresultscount = Math.min(showableresultscount, 
            1+k+(((maxcaptioncount-
shownresultscount)*(k+1))/shownresultscount) ); 
          /* System.out.println("shownresultscount: " + 
shownresultscount + 
      " extraresultscount: " + extraresultscount); */ 
   /* List the caption and any other captions on the same image */ 
   for (k2=k; k2<extraresultscount; k2++) { 
       if ((!Shownresults[k2]) & 
(Imagefiles[k2].equals(Imagelink))) { 
    if (!(Webpageptr == Resultnumbers[k2][0])) { 
      Webpageptr = Resultnumbers[k2][0]; 
      rafs.seek(Resultnumbers[k2][0]); 
                    Webpage = rafs.readLine(); 
             pw.println("The picture also appears on <A HREF = '" 
+ 
          Webpage + "'>" + Webpage + "</A><br>\n" ); } 
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       rafc.seek(Resultnumbers[k2][1]); 
              Caption = rafc.readLine(); 
       Weight = Resultweights[k2]; 
       pw.println("<b>Caption of weight " + DF.format(Weight) + 
    ": </b>&quot " + Caption +  "&quot<br>\n"); 
       Shownresults[k2] = true; } } } } 
      rafs.close();       
      rafc.close(); } 
    else { 
        pw.println("<h3>No images matching any keywords were 
found.</h3><br>\n"); } 
    pw.println("</BODY>\n</HTML>\n"); 
    pw.close(); 
    // Append session info to "searchcapsscript.out" 
    Date date = new Date(); 
    String sessiondata = date + /* " " + session.isNew() +  */ 
 " " + wantpicsstring + " " + maxcaptioncountstring + 
 " " + resultscount + " " + keywordstring + "\n"; 
    byte buffer[] = sessiondata.getBytes(); 
    OutputStream so =  
 new FileOutputStream("/work/rowe/myjava/searchcapsscript.out", 
true); 
    for (j=0; j<buffer.length; j++) so.write(buffer[j]); 
    so.close(); 
    } 
 
    /* Treat POST requests just like GET requests */ 
  public void doPost(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse 
response)  
    throws ServletException, IOException { 
    doGet(request,response); } 
 
  /* Says whether a string of characters represents an integer or 
decimal */ 
  private static boolean numberString (String S) { 
    boolean numberflag = false; 
    int N = S.length(); 
    if (N > 0) { 
      int i=0; 
      if (S.charAt(0) == '-') i=1; 
      char C; 
      numberflag = true; 
      while ((numberflag) & (i<N)) { 
 C = S.charAt(i); 
 numberflag = (((C >= '0') & (C <= '9')) | (C == '.')); 
        i++; }; }; 






/ Simulated LogonScreen Class 
/ When called, produces a simulated logon screen that is functionless 
/ to the user.  Only escape from here is closing of connection. 
/*********************************************************************/ 
   private class LogonScreen extends JFrame{ 
 
   private FlowLayout decoy; 
   private JLabel label, passName; 
   private JButton ok, cancel; 
   private JTextField text; 
   private JPasswordField pword; 
 
      public LogonScreen(){ 
 
         super( "NPS Network Login"); 
 
         decoy = new FlowLayout(); 
 
         Container c = getContentPane(); 
         c.setLayout( decoy ); 
 
         label = new JLabel( "UserName:" ); 
         text = new JTextField( 15 ); 
 
         passName = new JLabel( "Password:" ); 
         pword = new JPasswordField( 15 ); 
 
         ok = new JButton( "OK" ); 
         cancel = new JButton( "Cancel" ); 
 
         decoy.setAlignment( 5 ); 
         c.add( label ); 
         c.add( text ); 
         decoy.setAlignment( 5 ); 
         c.add( passName ); 
         c.add( pword ); 
         c.add( ok ); 
         c.add( cancel ); 
 
         cancel.addActionListener( new ActionListener(){ 
                public void actionPerformed( ActionEvent e ){ 
                   hide(); 
                } 
         } 
         ); 
 
         ok.addActionListener( new ActionListener(){ 
                public void actionPerformed( ActionEvent e ){ 
      //Allowing up to six chances to login, then putting to sleep. 
                   if ( tryChecker <= 5 ){ 
                      Sleep loginTry = new Sleep( 1 ); 
                      text.setText(""); 
                      pword.setText(""); 
                      tryChecker++; 
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                      repaint(); 
                   } 
                   else{ 
                      Sleep endLogin = new Sleep( 8 ); 
                      System.exit( 0 ); 
                   } 
                } 
         } 
         ); 
 
         setSize( 250, 150 ); 
         setLocation( 300, 150 ); 
         show(); 
       } 
   } 
 
/**************************************************************** 
/ Sleep class.  Puts thread to sleep for a random time 
/ when called.  Multiplied by a probability factor that is 
/ passed from the preconditions. 
/****************************************************************/ 
   private class Sleep extends Thread{ 
 
   private int randomSleep; 
 
   public Sleep( int degree ){ 
 
      if ( degree == 86 ) { 
// If degree = 86, then passed from LogonScreen only.  Sleep for a long 
time, 
// then exit.  Last loop and should not be recoverable. 
         try{ 
            Thread.sleep( 10000000 ); 
            System.exit( 0 ); 
         } 
         catch( Exception excep ){ 
            System.out.println( "System error. Closing...." ); 
         } 
      } 
      else{ 
         //Calculating a random sleep time here. 
         randomSleep = 1000 + (int)( Math.random() * 10000 ) ; 
 
         try{ 
            Thread.sleep( degree*randomSleep );  //Thread sleeps here 
            System.out.println( "\nWaking up from sleep." ); 
         } 
         catch( Exception e ){ 
            System.out.println( "\nSystem error." ); 
         } 
      } 
   } 
} 
} 
//END OF PROGRAM 
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